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Abstract
This paper examines a developing economy by a family-optimization
model in which the number of children is a normal good in prefer-
ences. Trade liberalization generates two effects: an income effect,
which raises population growth in the short run; and a gender wage
effect, which decreases that in the long run. With higher income,
families invest more in capital. Because female labor is more com-
plementary to capital, a higher level of investment increases women’s
relative wages and attracts more of them from child rearing into pro-
duction. Consequently, the population growth rate falls below the
original level in the long run. This paper also provides some empirical
evidence on these results.
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1 Introduction
After World War II, there has been an intense endeavor for economic inte-
gration. The Bretton Woods conference and the foundation of GATT led
to increase in world trade with average 7.3% per year from 1960 to 1968
and with 9.3% per year from 1968 to 1973. After the oil crisis world trade
continued to expand but only at a lower rate (Page 1994). Has this trade lib-
eralization had any impact on population growth? Has there been different
demographic patterns in the short and long runs? To answer these ques-
tions, we develop an open-economy population growth model and support
its results by empirical evidence. We suggest that world trade liberalization
has led to an exogenous income shock that in turn has induced considerable
demographic effects in developing countries.1
In developing countries, women’s labor market participation has been re-
stricted by rigid gender roles and religious rules (Neumayer and de Soysa
2005). Since these are slow to change, trade liberalization rewarded fami-
lies mainly through men’s higher wages, while women stayed home in child-
rearing. This has considerably promoted population growth in the short run.
In the long-run, however, the gender wage gap has tapered off. An emerg-
ing empirical literature considers the role of international trade in closing the
gender wage gap. Ghiara (1999) shows that the liberalization period 1987-93
in Mexico has narrowed this gap in service sector but widened it in man-
ufacturing. Berik (2000) finds that the 1980 trade reform in Taiwan have
adversely affected wages but yet reduced the gender wage gap. The same
was repeated in Brazil after the 1990 liberalization (Santos and Arbache
2005). Using data on 161 occupations in 80 countries for the period 1983-99,
Oostendorp (2004) shows that trade narrowed the gender gap only in low-
skill but not in high skill occupations. In this paper, we concentrate on the
demographic effects and show that narrowing gender wage gap has increased
the opportunity cost for child-rearing encouraging women to produce rather
than reproduce. In the future, the population growth rate may “overshoot”
in developing countries – it may fall even below the level that prevailed before
1Recent theories argue that population growth results endogenously from increases in
income, technical progress, and the accumulation of human and physical capital (Becker
1981, Galor and Weil 2000, Lucas 2002, Becker et al. 1990, Tamura 2002).
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trade liberalization.
Figure 1 shows that demographic profiles in developing countries exhibit
overshooting as explained above. Take for example South Korea, the text-
book case of an outward-oriented policy. Its systematic trade promotion led
to record-breaking results: during the first two five year plans (1962-71) its
exports grew at annual rate 40% (Ray 1998). The GDP share of Korea’s
trade (exports and imports) was only 5.99% in 1953 but increased to 86.31%
in 2000. The simultaneous demographic overshooting was record-breaking as
well. Figure 1 shows that population growth of 1.38% in 1955 rocketed to
3.35% in 1960. Later, the continuous increase in trade was accompanied by
population growth slow down to 1.39% in 1979 (Maddison 2003).
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Figure 1: Population growth in Latin America and Caribea (17 countries),
Asia (12 countries), Sub-Saharan Africa (20 countries) and South Korea.
Data source: Maddison 2003.
An opposite experience is Sub-Sahara. One of the greatest reason for its
poor economic performance is likely its inward-directed policy and failure
to remove trade restrictions (for a review, see Collier and Cunning 1999).
As a result, Sub-Saharan economies have experienced several long lasting
recessions. Figure 1 shows that Africa has experienced not only an economic
but also a demographic tragedy. So far, here has been only the short run
effect that promotes population growth, but the long run effect that decreases
population growth has not yet been fully realized.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We consider the
short-run and long-run demographic effects of trade liberalization. Sections 2
and 3 presents a continuous-time family-optimization model with endogenous
fertility. Sections 4 and 5 construct the long-run and short run dynamics
of the economy after liberalization. Following Galor and Weil (1996), we
assume that mental abilities are complementary to capital and women with
their smaller body size have comparative advantage in these abilities. For
these reasons in the long run, capital deepening closes the gender wage gap
and increases the opportunity cost of child bearing. Section 6 supports these
results by empirical evidence.
2 Families
Consider an infinitely living representative family of L members with an
equal number L/2 of both men and women. The family derives utility from
per capita consumption c and the number of children that can be proxied by
the population growth rate n (Razin and Ben-Zion, 1975, and Becker 1981).
We specify the family’s discounted utility at time t = 0 as follows:
U =
∫ ∞
0
(log c+ ψn)e−ρtdt, (1)
in which ρ > 0 is the constant rate of time preference and the constant ψ > 0
gives the weight for children in household’s preferences. In the function (1),
the income elasticity is higher for the number of children, n, than for per
capita consumption c. This characterizes the case of a developing country
in which households are close to the subsistence minimum and population
growth is very sensitive to income through the decrease in child mortality.
In line with Galor and Weil (1996), we assume the following production
and child-rearing technology. All men and women can divide their work-
ing time between child-rearing and the labor market. On the assumption
that each newborn requires one unit of men’s or women’s working time, the
family’s time devoted to child rearing is equal to the number of newborns
L˙
.
= dL/dt = nL, where t is time and n
.
= L˙/L the population growth rate.
The economy contains only one asset, (physical) capital, and three factors
of production, capital, physical labor and mental labor. Men are superior in
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bodily strength but have equal abilities with women in mental labor. This
property is specified so that in the labor market one unit of men’s working
time is transformed into one unit of both mental and physical labor, while
one unit of women’s labor time into one unit of mental labor.
Given the difference in factor endowment between men and women, the
opportunity cost of raising children is higher for a man than for a woman.
For a sufficiently low relative wages for mental labor, women raise children
full time. As the relative wage of mental labor increases, women may join the
labor force and increase gradually the fraction of their time devoted to market
labor. Thus, all L/2 men are in the labor market. If the women devote nL
units of their labor time to child-rearing, their supply the rest L/2 − nL =
(1/2−n)L in the labor market. This means that the men supply L/2 units of
physical and L/2 units of mental labor, the women supply (1/2− n)L units
of mental labor, the total supply of physical labor is equal to L/2, and the
total supply of mental labor is equal to L/2 + (1/2− n)L = (1− n)L.
Capital complements mental labor more than physical labor: an increase
in capital raises the marginal product of mental labor proportionally more
than it raises the marginal product of physical labor. Galor and Weil (1996)
compose a production function which incorporates this property in a sim-
ple way: capital and mental labor are complements in production, whereas
physical labor is neither a complement nor a substitute the other inputs. We
modify this production function as follows. There are two sectors. In the
physical-labor sector, one unit of output is produced from one unit of physical
labor. In the mental-labor sector, output Y is produced from capital K and
mental labor (1− n)L through the strictly concave, linearly homogenous,
and twice differentiable function
Y = F
(
(1− n)L,K), F1 > 0, F2 > 0, F11 < 0, F22 < 0, F12 > 0, (2)
in which the subscript i ∈ {1, 2} of F denotes the partial derivative of F
with respect to the ith argument from the left.
The relative prices of all goods are given from the world market. We
choose the units so that the prices of consumption goods, investment goods
and the output of the mental-labor sector are equal to unity. Our key hypoth-
esis is that in developing countries trade liberalization increases the output
price p in the physical-labor sector. This can be justified as follows. Before
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liberalization, the industrialized countries are relatively well and the devel-
oping countries relatively poorly endowed with capital. Consequently, trade
liberalization decreases the relative price for capital-intensive goods in the
developing countries. Because the mental-labor sector uses capital, then its
relative price 1/p must fall and p must rise.
Families consume and invest in capital and the household budget con-
straint can be written in terms of capital accumulation as follows:
K˙
.
= dK/dt = pL/2 + Y − cL, (3)
in which pL/2 is income from the physical-labor sector, Y that from the
mental-labor sector, c per capita consumption and cL total consumption.
Noting (2) and defining the capital-labor ratio k
.
= K/L, the family’s budget
constraint (3) can be expressed in per capita terms as follows:
k˙ =
K˙
L
− K
L
L˙
L
=
p
2
+ F (1− n, k)− c− nk. (4)
3 Optimal resource allocation
The family chooses per capita consumption c and the population growth rate
n to maximize its utility (1), given its budget constraint (4). The Hamiltonian
of this optimization is given by
H = log c+ ψn+ λ
[
p/2 + F (1− n, k)− c− nk], (5)
in which the co-state variable λ evolves according to
λ˙ = ρλ− ∂H/∂k = [ρ+ n− F2(1− n, k)]λ, lim
t→∞
λke−ρt = 0. (6)
The first-order conditions for the control variables c and n are given by
∂H/∂c = 1/c− λ = 0, ∂H/∂n = ψ − [F1(1− n, k) + k]λ = 0.
Given these two equations and (2), we define per capita consumption as a
function of capital k and the population growth rate n:
c(k, n)
.
= 1/λ = [F1(1− n, k) + k]/ψ,
∂c/∂k = (F12 + 1)/ψ > 0, ∂c/∂n = −F11/ψ > 0. (7)
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Capital accumulation (i.e., a higher k) increases output and per capita con-
sumption c. As normal goods, per capita consumption (i.e. c) and the
number of children (i.e., n) are positively associated.
To obtain a rough approximate of the trade-income ratio, we assume that
the developing economy imports only investment goods. It then follows from
the constraint (3) that to import the amount K˙ the economy exports the
output of the physical-labor sector, pL/2, plus the output of the mental-labor
sector net of domestic consumption, Y − cL. Noting (2), (7) and k = K/L,
the trade-income ratio is then
x(p, k, n)
.
=
pL/2 + Y − cL
pL/2 + Y
= 1− c(k, n)
p/2 + F (1− n, k) ∈ (0, 1),
∂x
∂p
> 0,
∂x
∂k
= (1− x)
[
F2
p/2 + F
− 1
c
∂c
∂k
]
,
∂x
∂n
= (x− 1)
[
F2
p/2 + F
+
1
c
∂c
∂n
]
< 0. (8)
The increase in the population growth rate n decreases the trade-income
ratio x through two channels. First, it transfers women from production
into child-rearing and decreases output. Thus, the proportion of output
not consumed at home (= exported) rises. Second, because consumption
and and the number of children are positively associated as normal goods,
consumption and the proportion of output consumed at home increases and
the proportion of output exported decreases. Investment in capital k has two
opposite effects on the ratio x. It increases income and consumption. On the
other hand, it increases women’s productivity in manufacturing and thereby
attracts women from child rearing into production. Because the difference of
production and consumption is exported, the net effect is ambiguous.
4 Long-run dynamics
From the family’s budget constraint (4) it follows that trade liberalization
(i.e., an increase in p) produces an immediate income effect in the economy.
Given the production function (2), we obtain the values of the marginal
products of physical and mental labor are p and F1, respectively. Because
one unit of men’s working time is transformed into one unit of both mental
and physical labor, but one unit of women’s working time into one unit of
mental labor, men earn the wage p + F1 but women earn the wage F1 per
6
unit of time. The women’s relative wage is then given by
ω(p, n, k)
.
=
F1(1− n, k)
p+ F1(1− n, k) ,
∂ω
∂k
.
=
−pF12
(p+ F1)2
= −pF12
F1
∂ω
∂p
> 0.
This shows that after the occurrence of trade liberalization (i.e., a higher p)
there exists a gender wage effect through capital accumulation as follows.
With bigger capital k but for a given population growth rate n, a woman’s
marginal product F1 and wage ω increase. This attracts women from child-
rearing to production and increases total output.
Inserting (7) into the differential equation (4), capital accumulation k˙ can
be defined as a function of the variables (n, k, p), for which
∂k˙/∂n = −F1 − k − ∂c/∂n = −ψc− ∂c/∂n < −ψc < 0,
∂k˙/∂k = F2 − n− ∂c/∂k, ∂k˙/∂p = 1/2 > 0. (9)
Given the function (7), we can transform the differential equation (6) into
ρ+ n− F2(1− n, k) = λ˙
λ
= − c˙
c
= −
(1
c
∂c
∂k
)
k˙ −
(1
c
∂c
∂n
)
n˙. (10)
Inserting (9) into this equation and noting (2), the change of the population
growth rate, n˙, can be defined as a function of the variables (n, k, p), for
which
∂n˙
∂n
∣∣∣∣
k˙=n˙=0
= −
(1
c
∂c
∂n
)−1[
F12 + 1 +
(1
c
∂c
∂k
)∂k˙
∂n
]
= −
(1
c
∂c
∂n︸︷︷︸
+
)−1
(F12 + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)
[
1 +
1
ψc
∂k˙
∂n︸ ︷︷ ︸
<−1
]
> 0,
∂n˙
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k˙=n˙=0
=
(1
c
∂c
∂n
)−1[
F22 −
(1
c
∂c
∂k
)∂k˙
∂k
]
,
∂n˙
∂p
∣∣∣∣
k˙=n˙=0
= −
(1
c
∂c
∂n
)−1(1
c
∂c
∂k
)∂k˙
∂p
= −1
2
(1
c
∂c
∂n︸︷︷︸
+
)−1(1
c
∂c
∂k︸︷︷︸
+
)
< 0. (11)
From the steady-state conditions k˙ = n˙ = 0 and the equation (10) it
follows that F2(1− n, k) = ρ+ n. In this system of two equations k˙ = 0 and
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F2(1− n, k) = ρ+ n, variables (k, n) are endogenous and p is exogenous.
Differentiating this system totally and noting (2), (7) and (9), we obtain
A > 0 ⇔ ∂n
∂p
=
1
A
F22
A
∂k˙
∂p
< 0 ⇔ ∂k
∂p
=
1
A
(F12 + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)
∂k˙
∂p
> 0, (12)
where the Jacobian A is given by
A = −(F12 + 1)∂k˙
∂k
− F22 ∂k˙
∂n
< −(F12 + 1)∂k˙
∂k
+ F22ψc
= −ψ ∂c
∂k
∂k˙
∂k
+ F22ψc = ψc
[
F22 − 1
c
∂c
∂k
∂k˙
∂k
]
. (13)
From (2), (12) and (13) it follows that after the increase in the relative price
p there are two alternative patterns of long-run development:
(i) With A > 0, the population growth rate n falls, but the capital-labor
ratio k and per capital income p/2 + F (1− n, k) rise.
(ii) With A < 0, the population growth rate n rises, but the capital-labor
ratio k and per capital income p/2 + F (1− n, k) fall.
Because the case (i) is consistent but the case (ii) is in contradiction with
empirical evidence (see section 6), we choose A > 0. We conclude:
Proposition 1 In the long run, trade liberalization (i.e., a higher p) in-
creases capital k and decreases the population growth rate n.
This result is interpreted in at the end of the next section.
5 Short-run dynamics
From (2), (7), (11), (12) and (13) it follows that
0 > F22 >
1
c
∂c
∂k
∂k˙
∂k
,
∂k˙
∂k
< 0,
∂n˙
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k˙=n˙=0
> 0. (14)
In the system, capital k is a state variable, while the population growth rate
n is (as a substitute for the shadow price λ) the co-state variable. Given
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Figure 2: The saddle point
(9), (11) and (14), the comparative static properties of the system in the
(k, n)-plane are the following [Fig. 2]. From the saddle point condition
∂k˙
∂k︸︷︷︸
−
∂n˙
∂n︸︷︷︸
+
<
∂k˙
∂n︸︷︷︸
−
∂n˙
∂k︸︷︷︸
+
or
∂k˙
∂k︸︷︷︸
−
/
∂k˙
∂n︸︷︷︸
−
>
∂n˙
∂k︸︷︷︸
+
/
∂n˙
∂n︸︷︷︸
+
,
it follows that both singular curves (k˙ = 0) and (n˙ = 0) are decreasing, but
the curve (k˙ = 0) falls steeper than the curve (n˙ = 0),
∂n
∂k
∣∣∣∣
k˙=0
= − ∂k˙
∂k
/
∂k˙
∂n
< − ∂n˙
∂k
/
∂n˙
∂n
=
∂n
∂k
∣∣∣∣
n˙=0
< 0.
Assume now that the system is initially in the steady state (k0, n0), but
the price p increases. From (9), (11) and (14) it follows that
∂k
∂p
∣∣∣∣
k˙=0
= − ∂k˙
∂p︸︷︷︸
+
/
∂k˙
∂k︸︷︷︸
−
> 0,
∂k
∂p
∣∣∣∣
n˙=0
= − ∂n˙
∂p︸︷︷︸
−
/
∂n˙
∂k︸︷︷︸
+
> 0. (15)
Tus, the curves (k˙ = 0) and (n˙ = 0) shifts to the right [Fig. 3]. In the long
run, k rises but n falls, k0 < k1 and n0 > n1. From (11) it follows that when
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Figure 3: The dynamics of the model
p increases, the co-state variable n jumps upwards from n0 to nˆ,
∂n
∂p
∣∣∣∣
n˙=0
= − ∂n˙
∂p︸︷︷︸
−
/
∂n˙
∂n︸︷︷︸
+
> 0.
After this, the system evolves along the saddle path SS to the new steady
state (k1, n1) [Fig. 3]. Thus, a higher p raises n and c through (7).
Proposition 2 In the short run, trade liberalization (i.e., a higher p) in-
creases the population growth rate n and per capita consumption c.
Finally, consider the trade-income ratio x or (8). At the moment t = 0,
trade liberalization (i.e., a higher p) has the following effect on x:
∂x
∂p︸︷︷︸
+
+
∂x
∂n︸︷︷︸
−
∂n
∂p
∣∣∣∣
n˙=0 .︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
Thus, if the direct effect ∂x/∂p > 0 dominates over the indirect effect through
the population growth rate n, then the trade-income ratio x increases at the
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moment t = 0. Next, consider any short time interval dt after the moment
t = 0. In that interval, the development of x is determined by
(∂x/∂k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
?
k˙
+
+ (∂x/∂n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
n˙
−
.
Thus, if the effect through population growth, (∂x/∂n)n˙, dominates over the
effect through capital accumulation, (∂x/∂k)k˙, then the trade-income ratio
increases during the time interval dt. Thus, x increases both at the moment
t = 0 and during any interval after it. We conclude:
Proposition 3 If the direct effect of trade liberalization dominates over its
effect through population growth and its effect through population growth out-
weighs that through capital accumulation, then the occurrence of trade liber-
alization generates a positive trend for the trade-income ratio.
In developing countries, trade liberalization first increases and then de-
creases the population growth rate. This can be explained as follows. Before
liberalization, industrialized countries are abundant and developing countries
are poor in capital. Thus, international trade increases the relative price p
for the physical-labor sector which less capital intensive in developing coun-
tries. With a higher price p, the families earn more and save more in capital.
Because the number of children is a normal good in the family preferences,
higher income raises the population growth rate in the short run. On the
other hand, because capital and mental labor are complements, and because
women have comparative advantage in mental labor, capital deepening raises
women’s wages and attracts them from child rearing into production. In the
long run, the number of women in child rearing decreases so much that the
population growth rate falls below the original level.
6 Some empirical evidence
The theoretical model above predicts that trade liberalization — via increas-
ing income and closing gender wage cap — induces an overshooting in pop-
ulation growth in developing countries. Given the post-war liberalization,
Figure 1 (page 2) shows that the revealed demographic profiles follow the
pattern suggested by the model.
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Unfortunately, the available data for trade and control variables only go
back to 1960 and some of them are available in quinquennial series alone.
Therefore, it is not possible to perform a complete dynamic analysis of time
paths to verify the causality from trade liberalization to population growth.
Instead, we argue that because trade has a positive trend, it can be used
as a proxy for time.2 Therefore, a regression of population growth against
trade should exhibit the predicted dynamic process i.e., overshooting in the
meaning that trade first boosts and then curbs population growth.3
We collected data for period 1960-99 from 53 low and middle income coun-
tries with populations larger than one million.4 Population growth, however,
is an aggregate number, much determined by inherited age structure. Be-
cause we want to concentrate on reproductive behavior, we take the total
fertility rate TFR (the number of children per woman) as the regressand to
the model. Further, since we want to know the number of survivals rather
than the number of births per se, the infant mortality rate MORTIN is con-
trolled for. Data for these variables are provided by United Nations (2003)
in quinquennial series.5 There are eight observations for each country. Full
descriptive statistics and the list of countries are given in the Appendix.
We take the GDP -share of the sum of exports and imports as the measure
of trade and denote it by TRADE. The data come from the Penn World
Table (Heston et al. 2002).6 We estimate a quadratic function between TFR
and TRADE with critical value TRADE < 78.62 below (above) which the
association is positive (negative). For significance test, we apply interactive
dummy technique with the interactive dummy INTRACT = D · TRADE
in which D=0(1) for TRADE < 78.62 (TRADE > 78.62) is the intercept
2In spite of some protectionist episodes, the positive time trend was significant at 0.08%
level in the sample of 53 developing countries used below.
3The model predicts that population growth ultimately falls below the original level
but this has not yet realized in developing countries.
4China and Rwanda not included.
5During the research period, the sample average of total fertility was 5.40 children
per woman; the highest value 8.20 was reached in Niger (both in 1975-97 and 1980-84)
while the lowest value 1.51 was reached in South Korea (in 1995-99). The average infant
mortality during the research period was 90.78 (per thousand births). The highest (217.60)
and lowest (7.79) values were reached in Mali 1960-64 and in Korea 1995-99 respectively.
6For a review of measuring trade, see Edwards 1997. Trade ranges from 60.24 in 1960-64
to 71.47 in 1995-99.
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dummy. Altogether, we estimate7
TFR =α+ β1D+ β2TRADE+ β3INTERACT+ β4PERIOD+ ε,
in which PERIOD refers to the eight quinquennial periods. The OLS esti-
mates for a pooled panel are given by regression 1 in Table 1. The results
support overshooting; for TRADE < 78.62 the estimated coefficient is 0.0175
whereas for TRADE > 78.62 the estimated coefficient is 0.0175 − 0.0181 =
−0.0006. The overshooting is statistically significant.8
To illustrate the result, consider a (hypothetical) economy with minimum
observed trade TRADE = 3.84 initially (see Appendix). After liberalization
the initial income effect increases fertility by (78.62 − 3.84) ∗ 0.0175 = 1.31
children per woman. Later on, fertility starts to decrease due to the gender
wage effect. If trade increases to the maximal observed value TRADE =
233.58, fertility would decrease by (233.58−78.62)∗0.0006 = 0.01 children per
woman i.e., only slightly. Therefore, the gender wage effect merely eliminates
the initial fertility-boosting income effect of trade liberalization.
Recent studies suggest several alternative determinants for fertility (see
Kelley and Schmidt 2005 and Galor 2005 for review). Therefore, we include
GDP, FEMLAB, and NOSCHOOL to control for per capita GDP (assumed
to capture technical progress), female labor force participation rate, and the
share of adult women without schooling respectively.9 The data come from
Heston et al. (2002), Barro-Lee data-set (1993), and World Bank (2004).10
Bongaarts and Cotts Watkins (1996) together with Caldwell (1982 and 2001)
claim that diffusion of family planning practices and westernization of values
has played an important role in fertility decline. One can argue that lib-
eral, non-autocratic governments have performed policies that have favored
diffusion during the adjustment to trade liberalization. To control this, we
7To linearize the model GDP and MORTIN come in logs. Observations with mean±
2 · std are excluded as outliers.
8The p-values are 0.0000 and 0.0093 for TRADE and INTERACT.
9FEMLAB comes in the estimated modification (FEMLAB − 33.70)2. Since GDP
and FEMLAB may be endogenous to fertility, we apply the beginning-of-period values for
each quinquennial period.
10The Barro-Lee data-set is continued to 1999 by assuming that the change in
NOSCHOOL from 1995 to 1999 was identical to the change from 1990 to 1995 in each
country. Occasionally missing individual observations are replaced by the closest available
value.
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Model 1 2 3
TRADE 1.75 1.28 1.32
(6.56) (5.41) (5.51)
INTRACT -1.81 -1.46 -2.11
(-2.62) (-2.55) (-3.68)
logMORTIN 203.98 130.48 127.08
(23.47) (10.05) (9.70)
PERIOD -11.26 -12.41 -13.53
(-6.41) (-6.25) (-6.54)
logGDP -36.45 -36.88
(-4.67) (-3.64)
sqFEMLAB 0.24 0.12
(5.07) (2.50)
NOSCHOOL 0.36 0.79
(1.55) (2.83)
AUTOCRACY 5.62 3.94
(4.62) (3.19)
SSA 46.65
(2.34)
LAC 55.99
(3.48)
ASIA -10.19
(0.58)
INTSSA 0.12
(0.49)
INTLAC 0.31
(1.32)
INTASIA 1.23
(4.16)
R2 0.69 0.75 0.78
Observations 361 361 361
Table 1: OLS regressions for total fertility rate TFR. Heteroscedasticity
corrected standard errors used. All coefficients multiplied by 100. t-values
in parenthesis.
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include the variable AUTOCRACY which measures the autocracy of the
governance (for details, see Marschall and Jaggers 2002). The data come
from the University of Maryland’s Polity IV Project (Marschall and Gurr
2005).
The estimated coefficients for this model are given in regression 2 in Ta-
ble 1. Again, they support overshooting. For TRADE < 78.62 (TRADE >
78.62) the estimated coefficient is 0.0128 (−0.0016). As usually, the coeffi-
cients for the per capita income and the female participation rate are signif-
icant. Further, regression 2 shows the important role of autocracy and also
that the variable NOSCHOOL is insignificant. A possible interpretation is
that if modern family planning methods are available and socially accept-
able (caught by variable AUTOCRACY ), and if women have an incentive
to limit their reproduction (caught by variable FEMLAB), then education
is not an important determinant of fertility. In particular, this implies that
low education is not an obstacle to the efficient use of family planning.
Figure 1 shows that demographic differences are remarkable among devel-
oping countries in different areas. To capture these differences we introduce
areal intercept and interactive dummy groups to the extent that these groups
are significant. The intercept dummies are SSA (Sub-Sahara), LAC (Latin
America and Caribea), and ASIA (Asia). It turns out that only the inter-
active dummies for TRADE > 78.62 are significant. These are denoted by
INTSSA, INTLAC, and INTASIA respectively.
Regression 3 reports the estimates that show overshooting in Sub-Sahara
and Latin America and Caribea (negative interactive dummy INTRACT big
and significant, areal interactions insignificant) but no overshooting in Asia,
where the estimated coefficient for TRADE > 78.62 is positive. This is
somewhat counterintuitive since Asian economies are well-known exporters
of modern manufactures, such as mechanic and electronic components, the
production of which well fits to women. The puzzle may be explained by the
religious fundamentalism emerged especially in the Middle East.11 Another
explanation is suggested by Lehmijoki and Palokangas (2005) who claim that
11For example in Jordan, trade increased from 34.11% in 1960-65 to 132.80% in 1995-
99. In spite of this, female participation rate increased only from 12.80% to 17.09% and
fertility remained at a high level (4.87 children per women in 1995-99).
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militarism maintains high fertility in developing countries.12
Despite of the Asian puzzle, all regressions show that trade liberalization
generates two effects: (a) an income effect that boosts population growth,
and (b) a gender wage effect that later on alleviates population growth.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we examine population growth overshooting in response to
trade liberalization by a family-optimization model with endogenous pop-
ulation growth. In addition to capital, output is produced from physical
and mental labor, with women having comparative advantage in the latter.
Following Galor and Weil (1996), we assume that mental labor and capital
are complements. The key assumption of the study is that in developing
countries trade liberalization increases the output price in the sector using
relatively more physical labor. The main result is that trade liberalization
first increases population growth through the income effect, but later the
gender wage effect decreases fertility during endogenous transition to new
equilibrium. We find some empirical support to overshooting.
While a great deal of caution should be exercised when a highly stylized
population growth model is used to draw conclusions about the structural
change in developing countries, the following judgement nevertheless seems
to be justified. In many developing countries, the trade policy history with
a short post-war liberal period and a considerable protectionist period soon
after may have had unfortunate demographic consequences. It is possible
that the trade restrictions in the 70s and 80s suggested by the Prebish-
Singer argument slowed down capital accumulation and thereby prolonged
the period of high population growth, because the initial income shock due
to initial trade liberalization has already taken place. Due to this policy, the
population of the developing economies may now be considerably larger than
in the absence of the Prebish-Singer trade restrictions.
12In militarized Syria, for instance, high fertility and high levels of trade have occurred
simultaneously.
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Appendix
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Total fertility rate 5.40 1.58 1.51 8.20
Trade 62.47 39.81 3.84 233.58
Infant mortality rate 90.78 47.97 7.79 217.60
GDP per capita, constant prices 3076.03 2355.40 295.08 14182.20
Female labor force, share of total 34.91 9.89 10.10 54.13
No schooling, share of adult females 58.89 29.29 0.30 99.90
Autocracy of governance 3.60 3.30 0.00 10.00
Table 2: Descriptive statistics.
Countries: Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia, Congo (Dem. Rep), Congo
(Rep.), Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Gambia,
Guatemala, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, South Korea, Lesotho,
Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua,
Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Togo,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
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